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ABSTRACT
This article challenges the accepted wisdom, at least since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gault, that procedures in juvenile delinquency court should mimic the 
adult criminal process.  The legal basis for this challenge is Gault itself, as well as 
the other Supreme Court cases that triggered the juvenile justice revolution of the 
past decades, for all of these cases relied on the due process clause, not the provisions 
of the Constitution that form the foundation for adult criminal procedure.  That 
means that the central goal in juvenile justice is fundamental fairness, which does 
not have to be congruent with the adversarial tradition of adult criminal court.  
Instead, as the Court’s administrative procedure cases illustrate, fundamental 
fairness theory aims at constructing the procedural framework that best promotes 
fairness, accuracy and efficiency in the setting in question.  Social science, and in 
particular procedural justice research, can play an important role in fashioning this 
framework, because it can empirically examine various procedural mechanisms, in 
various settings, with these objectives in mind.  To date, procedural justice research 
suggests that the procedures associated with the adult criminal process are not 
optimal even in that setting, much less in a regime focused on rehabilitating or 
punishing children.  We propose a performance-based management system for 
implementing these legal and scientific insights in the juvenile justice context. 
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Part I:  Introduction
The early juvenile court was rooted in the state’s parens patriae
authority.1  Its goal was to treat wayward juveniles according to their 
“best interests”--akin to the way loving parents deal with their 
disobedient offspring--rather than as fully accountable adults under 
the criminal law.2 Instead of prosecution and punishment, juveniles 
were  subject to “adjudication” and “disposition,” 3 designed to help 
them change for the better.
A crucial corollary to this avuncular theory of juvenile justice 
was the belief that the procedures implementing it should also be 
different from the adult model.   More specifically, proponents of the 
juvenile court thought that procedural “informality” would best 
1 Doug Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile 
Court, 23 S.C. L.REV. 205 (1971). Cf. ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS:  
THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 159 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing that the 
adoption of the parens patriae justification for juvenile court was "an ex post 
facto fiction" designed to give spurious legitimacy to the new court).
2 Ralph A. Rossum, Holding Juveniles Accountable:  Reforming 
America’s “Juvenile Injustice System,” 22 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 907, 911 
(1995)(the juvenile court’s “mission was to remove young offenders from 
criminal courts and to provide them with the care and supervision typical of 
that found in a stable and loving family.”).
3 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 1999 NATIONAL REPORT SERIES, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: A CENTURY OF CHANGE 11-12 (Dec. 1999), available at 
www.ncjrs.org//html/ojjdp/9912_2/-juv3 (describing the euphemistic 
terminology of the juvenile court). 
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serve its substantive objective of individualized care.4  Thus, for more 
than half a century, the juvenile justice system functioned largely in 
the absence of the procedural rules found in adult court and beyond 
the oversight and review of the regular judicial system.5
Over time, however, it became apparent that the juvenile 
justice system was not living up either to its rehabilitative goal or to 
the expectation that relaxed procedures would facilitate that goal.  
Among legal scholars, courts and other policymakers, there was a 
growing conviction that procedural formality had been sacrificed for 
a rehabilitative agenda that never materialized.6  The culmination of 
this criticism came in Justice Fortas’ famous speculation in Kent v. 
United States that those enmeshed in the juvenile justice system were 
receiving “the worst of both worlds: . . . neither the protections 
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment 
postulated for children.”7
Given the Court’s long-standing reticence about using 
substantive due process to order change in state practices,8 the 
“world” it decided to do something about was the procedural one.  
And the way it sought to heal the systemic wound it perceived in 
Kent was to transplant adult procedures to the juvenile context.   
Subsequent Court decisions provided juveniles with the rights to 
counsel, silence, cross-examination, and almost all of the rest of the 
adult procedural armamentarium.9
4 See infra text accompanying notes 20-23.
5 SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 745 
(1997) (pointing out that “[f]rom the earliest beginnings until Justice Fortas’s 
decision in Kent in 1966, juvenile courts operated without legal oversight or 
monitoring.”)
6 See, e.g., Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 
1961); Juvenile Delinquency, HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO 
INVESTIGATE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1959-1960); Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile 
Court and the Adversary System:  Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. 
REV. 7, 7 (1965).
7  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
8 JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358 (3d ed. 1986) 
(detailing the Court’s retreat from Lochnerian substantive activism out of 
concern that it was trenching on legislative prerogatives, while it 
maintained rigorous review of procedural due process claims). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 47-52.
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Important to note, however, is that this procedural revolution 
was based in large part on the general language of the due process 
clause, not the specific adversarial guarantees in the sixth 
amendment providing for notice, public jury trial, confrontation, 
compulsory process and counsel in “all criminal prosecutions.”10  In 
other words, the Court imposed the adult model on the juvenile 
court not because the language of the Constitution required it, but 
because the adult model was considered necessary to avoid 
deprivations of liberty without “due process of law.”11   That 
interpretive approach means that, if it turns out other procedural 
mechanisms can be shown to be just as “fair” as the adversarial 
model, those mechanisms might satisfy the Constitution.
Much legal scholarship on the juvenile justice system, 
however, has assumed just the opposite.  By that we mean that most 
scholars seem to think it obvious that the sixth amendment (as well 
as the fifth amendment’s right to silence) should apply to juveniles, 
and that juvenile procedures should be the same as or even more 
adversarial than those in adult court.12 Indeed, some commentators 
have proposed the abolition of the juvenile justice system as a 
10 The sixth amendment provides:  “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 53-73.
12 See, e.g., Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New 
Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146, 167 (1989) (“I advocate a juvenile court 
that has more, rather than fewer, procedural protections available than in 
criminal courts.”); Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some 
Observations on a Recent Trend, 10 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 129, 147 (1987) 
(“Juvenile proceedings are 'criminal' in nature when punishment is the 
sanction imposed. Therefore, the full trappings of the criminal process, 
including trial by jury in hearings open to the public, are constitutionally 
mandated.”); Irene M. Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children 
Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA 
L. REV. 656, 720-21 (1980) (“In the context  . . . of a delinquency adjudicatory 
proceeding that may lead to stigmatization and loss of liberty, the child’s 
immaturity often requires that the constitutional protection afforded be 
greater than that given to adults.”).
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separate procedural entity.13   Consistent with Justice Fortas’ 
observation, abolitionists remain skeptical about the reality and 
potential for rehabilitation, but are much more sanguine about the 
benefits of traditional procedural due process.  In effect, they assume 
that adult criminal procedural requirements are synonymous with 
“due process.”  
This article provides a critical analysis of this premise.   We 
argue that the pinnacle of procedural due process is not necessarily 
synonymous with adult criminal procedure requirements, and that 
youngsters can be afforded comparable or even enhanced procedural 
due process in other ways.14   Based on concepts of justice rooted in 
empirical research, we present a framework for reconceptualizing 
due process in juvenile justice with the ultimate aim of striking an 
optimal balance between fairness, accuracy, and efficiency in 
handling delinquency cases.  Rather than mechanically turning to 
adult criminal procedure as the gold standard of due process, we 
propose the adoption of a performance-based management system 
that draws on both modern trends in administrative law and recent 
advances in social science research on procedural justice and decision 
making.  While we believe that the procedural framework we present 
can and should effectively be linked to the rejuvenation of 
rehabilitative and preventive goals of the juvenile justice system, the 
merits of our procedural framework also should appeal to those 
committed to more punitive and retributivist regimes.
Part II of this article briefly recaps the substantive and 
procedural history of the juvenile court. Its primary message is that 
the Supreme Court’s procedural reform of the juvenile justice system 
13 Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the 
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 
1120 (1991)(“Treating juveniles differently from adults–by denying them 
jury trials, for example–violates the consistency norm of equal treatment for 
all and reminds the young that they do not have all the rights assigned to 
full-fledged members of the society.”); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile 
Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility and Sentencing Policy, 88 J.CRIM.L. 
& CRIMINOL. 68, 97 (1998) (“Procedural justice requires providing youths 
with full procedural parity with adult defendants and additional safeguards 
to account for the disadvantages of youth in the justice system.”). Cf. 
Katherine H. Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the 
Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23, 23-24 (1990).
14 Parts of this article are based on Mark R. Fondacaro, 
Reconceptualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and 
Behavioral Science (December 7, 2001) (paper presented at the 1st Annual 
Conference of the University of Florida Center on Children and the Law).
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was based on the due process clause and general principles of 
fundamental fairness, which leaves the door open to flexible 
approaches to juvenile justice procedure.  Part III then plumbs 
developments in the broader constitutional jurisprudence of 
procedure, particularly in the administrative and civil law arenas, 
which enthusiastically endorse that flexible view of due process.  
With the legal ground work laid for the proposition that juvenile 
justice procedure can be rethought, Part IV summarizes research on 
“procedural justice,” which suggests that the adversarial model of 
procedure is not necessarily the most “just,” whether viewed from a 
subjective or objective perspective.   Part V closes with a discussion 
of the implications of this research, and a proposal that due process 
in juvenile justice be reconceptualized in a way that allows empirical 
research and a performance-based management system to identify 
those procedures that best promote fairness, accuracy and efficiency. 
II. Substance and Procedure in Juvenile Court
The pendulum swings of juvenile justice in this country are a 
well-known story. Before the twentieth century minors were tried as 
adults.  The advent of a separate juvenile court with a rehabilitative 
orientation swung the pendulum the other way.  In the last two 
decades, however, concern about juvenile crime and pessimism 
about rehabilitation has pushed juvenile justice back toward the 
common law approach.   The substance and procedure of today’s 
juvenile court are much closer to the adult model than they were 
forty years ago.  But that does not mean the pendulum could not 
swing back yet again. 
A.   A Brief History of Juvenile Justice
Under the common law, minors charged with crime were 
tried in adult court.  They were exempted from criminal 
responsibility if they were under 7 years of age, but held fully 
accountable for their crimes if they were over 14.  In between those 
ages, they were presumed irresponsible, but that presumption was 
rebuttable.15  If convicted, children were often housed with adult 
prisoners.16
15 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (describing 
common law doctrine).  
16 PAUL R. KFOURY, CHILDREN BEFORE THE COURT: REFLECTIONS ON 
LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING MINORS 37 (2d ed. 1991) ("If convicted, (the 
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Around the turn of the twentieth century, dramatic change 
took place.  Reformers and social scientists successfully nudged the
dividing line between “youthful immaturity” and “adult maturity” 
to late adolescence, motivated by both a desire to avoid commercial 
exploitation of young people, especially immigrants,17 and a belief 
that youngsters were “works-in-progress” who needed additional 
time to prepare for the assumption of adult roles and 
responsibilities.18  The legal implementation of these ideas, in full 
flower nationwide by the 1930s, was the juvenile court, a separate 
system from adult court designed to “reform” children in trouble 
during their formative years so they would not develop into career 
criminals.19
The rehabilitative focus of the juvenile courts was 
accompanied by procedural informality, the near total absence, as 
one commentary put it, of “law, lawyers, reporters, and the usual 
paraphernalia of courts.”20  Judge Mack, one of the progenitors of the 
juvenile court, captured the idea nicely with his idyllic image of how 
the court should function:  “Seated at a desk, with the child at his 
side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and 
draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial 
dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work.”21 As 
this statement suggests, the logic behind the relaxation of procedure 
was that judicial understanding of the child’s character, lifestyle, and 
underlying problems, and thus of the appropriate treatment, could 
only be obtained through informal conversation.22  The adult 
juveniles) were cast into a common prison with older culprits to mingle in 
conversation and intercourse with them, acquire their habits, and by their 
instruction to be made acquainted with the most artful methods of 
perpetrating crime.") (quoting New York Society for the Reformation of 
Delinquents, 1826 Ann. Rep. 4 (1827)).
17 DAVID ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE:  THE ASYLUM 
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205-07 (1980).
18 See Ainsworth, supra note 13, at 1095 (describing the “child-study 
movement” of  the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
19 A. PLATT, supra note 1, at 9-10  (stating that by 1917, all but three 
states had a separate juvenile court, and by 1932, over 600 juvenile courts 
existed nationwide). 
20 DAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 745. 
21 Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909) 
22 SUSAN GUARINO-GHEZZI & EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, BALANCING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 90 (1995) (calling the juvenile court process a 
“conversation.”). See also, In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967) ("The early 
Due Process in Juvenile Justice 8
adversarial process was thought to be counterproductive; it was seen 
as stigmatizing, traumatizing, and above all else irrelevant, given 
that the primary role of the court was to encourage rehabilitation, not 
to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the child 
committed a bad act.23
By the end of the 1970s, however, the pendulum had swung 
back toward the adult model, with a vengeance.   On the substantive 
side, observers of the juvenile system, including social scientists, had 
concluded that “nothing works” when it comes to the rehabilitation 
of wayward juveniles.24  Simultaneously, the perception grew among 
the public that increasingly younger children were committing 
increasingly heinous crimes, while a lax juvenile justice system 
exacerbated the situation by failing to impose appropriate 
punishment and capitalize on its deterrent effect.25  Moreover, many 
came to believe that the treatment-oriented juvenile system 
contributed to moral failure among youth by failing to instill a sense 
of personal responsibility for behavior.26  Finally, even those who 
concept[ ] . . . of the [j]uvenile [c]ourt proceeding was one in which a 
fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by 
talking over [his or her] problems, by paternal advice and admonition. . . .") 
(quoting from Mack, supra note 21, at 120).
23 Mack, supra note 21, at 109, 119-120 (speaking of the need to avoid 
the stigmatization of criminal prosecution and stating that the primary 
determination to be made in juvenile court was not whether the juvenile is 
guilty but “what is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be 
done in his interest and the interest of the state to save him from downward 
career.”); TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 3 
(1967) (describing the interest of juvenile court reformers in avoiding the 
punitive atmosphere of adult court). 
24 Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: 
Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1160 (1968)
(“The evidence from [social science] studies suggests that the publicized 
goals of the juvenile court are rarely achieved.”). Cf. Robert Martinson, What 
Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 25
(1974) ("With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have 
been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.")
25 Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Tex. L. 
Rev. 799, 806-09 (2003) (describing public, legislative, and media responses 
to the perceived threat of juvenile offenders, and how these responses 
interacted to create a "moral panic").
26 See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 347, 390 (1999) (“The juvenile court's treatment ideology denied 
youths' personal responsibility, reduced offenders' duty to exercise self-
control, and eroded their obligations to change. If there is any silver lining 
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were not convinced that harsh punishment of juveniles was 
appropriate were concerned about abuse resulting from the absence 
of procedural rules in juvenile court.27
The changes stemming from these various reactions were 
legion.  On the substantive side, many jurisdictions eliminated or 
downgraded “status” offense jurisdiction for conduct like truancy 
and unruly behavior,28 lowered the age at which children could be 
transferred to adult court for most crimes, and required transfer for a 
wide array of serious offenses, in some states for children as young 
as eleven.29  Many states softened the impact of the latter two 
changes by providing that juveniles who were convicted in adult 
court should be subject to juvenile sentences or “blended” 
juvenile/adult sentences for most crimes.30  But the overall thrust of 
juvenile justice reform in the 1970s and 1980s was to “get tough” on 
young offenders, a movement that ran parallel to the increased 
sentences being handed out to adult offenders during this time 
period.31  This tendency has pretty much continued unabated 
through today.32
in the current cloud of "get tough" policies, it is the affirmation of 
responsibility.”). 
27 See, e.g., Margaret K. Rosenheim, Standards for Juvenile and Family 
Courts: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 1 FAM.L.Q. 25, 29 (1967) (advocating adult-
like protections because of the need to reach “an accommodation between 
the aspirations of the founders of the juvenile court and the grim realities of 
life against which, in part, the due process of criminal and civil law offers us 
protection.”). See generally, ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: 
AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978).
28 In 1994, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act, which required states receiving delinquency prevention 
funds to divert or de-institutionalize youth who had been referred for status 
offenses, 42 U.S.C. § 5601, and today prohibits detention of such offenders 
“in secure detention facilities or secure correctional facilities.” 42 U.S.C. §  
5633(a)(11)(A).
29 For a description of transfer statutes and a state-by-state review as 
of 1997, see OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:  1999 NATIONAL REPORT 106 (2000).  This 
document notes that, as of 1997, twenty-two states and the District of 
Columbia no longer impose any minimum age requirement for at least one 
method of transferring jurisdiction to adult court.  Id.
30 Id. at 108 (describing blended sentences movement and the states 
that have adopted it).  
31 Cathi J. Hunt, Juvenile Sentencing:  Effects of Recent Punitive 
Sentencing Legislation on Juvenile Offenders and a Proposal for Sentencing in 
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More relevant to this article, however, are the procedural 
changes that occurred.  These were prompted in large part by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in a series of decisions between 1966 and 1971.  
The overall impact of these decisions was to convert the juvenile 
court from an informal conversation into an adversarial proceeding.
B.  The Supreme Court’s Procedural Revolution in Juvenile Justice
Until 1966, the Supreme Court had not decided a single case 
involving juvenile court issues.33  In part, that had more to do with 
the Court’s changing view of its role as a national guardian of 
liberties than with juvenile court per se.  Only in the early 1960s had 
the Court even begun looking seriously at the adult criminal process: 
the sixth amendment’s right to trial counsel was not imposed on the 
states until 1963,34 while the fifth amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination and the sixth amendment right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses did not apply nationally until 1964 and 1965, 
respectively.35 But part of the Court’s silence on juvenile court issues 
was also due to the aforementioned lack of judicial oversight, even 
by the lower courts, over this separate system of justice.
Once the Supreme Court started its scrutiny of the juvenile 
courts, however, it did so with alacrity. Its first decision addressing a 
juvenile justice issue, Kent v. United States,36 involved a 16 year-old 
boy who was summarily transferred from juvenile to adult court 
once he admitted to the police that he had participated in 
housebreaking, robbery and rape.   The Court held, unanimously, 
that the failure to convene a transfer hearing to determine whether 
Juvenile Court, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 621, 624-33 (1999) (comparing 
developments in adult and juvenile sentencing regimes and noting the 
increasingly punitive approach toward both groups).
32 Id. at 623 (“As a result of these legislative changes, juveniles today 
face more severe sanctions than at any time since the inception of the 
juvenile justice system nearly a century ago.”).
33 Monrad Paulsen, Kent v. United States:  The Constitutional Context 
of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 167, 167, 177-80 (1966).
34 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
35  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)(fifth amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses).
36 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Due Process in Juvenile Justice 11
Kent should have been tried as an adult violated the Constitution. 37
The era of unbridled discretion in juvenile justice was suddenly over. 
The year after Kent the Supreme Court considered another 
case with even more important ramifications for juvenile justice 
procedure. In Application of Gault,38 a 15 year-old boy was committed 
by a juvenile court to a state industrial school for a maximum of 
almost six years (the remainder of his minority status), simply for 
making an obscene phone call to a neighbor.  Had Gault been an 
adult he would have faced no more than a $50 fine or a maximum of 
two months in jail.39 Furthermore, of course, he would have been 
entitled to the full panoply of procedural safeguards guaranteed to 
those adults.  
Instead, he received virtually none of them.  Neither Gault or 
his parents ever received formal notice of the charge.40  At the initial 
hearing the day after his arrest, with no lawyer and in the absence of 
Miranda warnings (which the Supreme Court had required in adult 
proceedings the year before41), Gault was questioned by the judge 
about whether he made lewd calls.42  He was then detained, without 
explanation as far as the record showed, in a children’s detention 
home for three or four days pending his adjudicatory hearing.43 At 
that hearing the probation officer, testifying unsworn, described un-
Mirandized statements made by Gault while he was in the detention 
home, and also presented a “referral report” to the judge which the 
Gaults were not allowed to see.44 Nor was the complaining neighbor 
present at the hearing.45  Had she been there, Gault or his parents 
would have had to conduct cross-examination themselves, because 
his family had not retained a lawyer, and had never been told they 
could do so.46
37 Id. at 553-54.
38 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39 Id. at 8-9.
40 Id. at 5.
41 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42 387 U.S. at 6.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 7 n.3.
45 Id. at 7.
46 Id. at 10.
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The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that this barebones 
procedure, one replicated every day in juvenile courts around the 
country, did not offend the requirements of the "due process 
concept."47   But the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that when a delinquency proceeding might lead to confinement in a 
state institution the state must provide: (1) written notice to the child 
and to the child’s parents of the charges against the child, provided 
far enough in advance to allow for preparation for the hearing;  (2) a 
right to counsel, including the right to have counsel appointed free of 
charge if the child or family is unable to afford one;  (3) the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, who are required to testify 
under oath; and (4)  the privilege against self-incrimination.48   In 
short, juveniles were now to receive most of the procedural 
protections accorded adults under the sixth and fifth amendments.
Three years later, in In re Winship,49 the Supreme Court 
administered the final touch to its “adultification” of the juvenile 
delinquency process.50  The Court first held that adults may not be 
convicted of a criminal offense unless its essential elements are 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.51  It then applied that holding to 
the adjudication phase of a delinquency proceeding.52  With this 
decision, and within a five-year period, the Court had imposed 
virtually all of the adult criminal procedure guarantees on the 
juvenile process.
47 Id. at 4.
48 Id. at 31-59.
49 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
50 We do not mean to neglect Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), 
which applied the double jeopardy clause to juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, with Chief Justice Burger himself writing “it is simply too late 
in the day to conclude . . . that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy [in a 
delinquency proceeding].”  Id. at 529.   However, this decision is not 
“procedural” in the sense we have been using that word in this article, to 
refer to the rules governing the adjudication process.  Rather it determined 
whether an acquittal or conviction in juvenile court may be relitigated in 
adult court.  Furthermore, within three years of Breed, the Court had upheld 
a state procedure that allowed prosecutors in juvenile court to appeal 
referee decisions acquitting a child of delinquency charges, Swisher v. 
Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978), a decision that significantly undermines the 
thrust of Breed.
51 Id. at 364.
52 Id. at 368.
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An important aspect of these three Supreme Court decisions 
that is often ignored, however, is their legal basis.   Adult criminal 
procedures flow primarily from the sixth amendment.  Kent, Gault
and Winship, on the other hand, relied almost exclusively on the due 
process clause.  That difference affords a much greater degree of 
flexibility in constructing a procedural framework.
The Court recognized this fact in all three decisions.  For 
instance, in Kent, in the sentence immediately following his well-
known “worst of both worlds” observation, Justice Fortas stated 
“[t]his concern, however, does not induce us . . . to accept the 
invitation to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be 
applicable to adults charged with the serious offenses . . . must be 
applied in juvenile court proceedings . . . .”53  Thus, Fortas stated, 
while juveniles in Kent’s situation were entitled to counsel, access to 
relevant records, and a statement of reasons for the transfer decision, 
the transfer hearing could still be “informal” and need not “conform 
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual 
administrative hearing.”54  In short, the procedural adequacy of the 
hearing granted in Kent was to be measured not by the extent to 
which it copied or incorporated all of the requirements of a criminal 
trial but rather by whether it functioned in accordance with 
principles of “fundamental fairness.”55
 In Gault as well, the Supreme Court anchored its 
requirements regarding notice, counsel and confrontation in due 
process “standards,” which it cautioned should be “intelligently and 
not ruthlessly administered” in the juvenile context;56 only the right 
to silence, found in the fifth amendment, was derived from a more 
specific Bill of Rights guarantee.  In essence, Justice Fortas’ majority 
opinion adopted a hybrid approach.  The majority’s result was 
identical to that reached by Justice Black in his concurring opinion, 
which argued that the procedural safeguards the Court adopted 
were tied to the explicit text of the fifth and sixth amendments,57 but 
its rationale was closer to Justice Harlan’s concurring and dissenting 
53 383 U.S. at 556.
54  Id. at 562.
55  Id.
56 Id. at 21.
57  387 U.S. at 64 (Black, J., concurring) (“I do not vote to invalidate 
this Arizona law on the ground that it is ‘unfair’ but solely on the ground 
that it violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments made obligatory on the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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opinion, which contended that all of the constitutionally mandated 
procedural safeguards in the delinquency context should stem from 
the due process clause and derive from basic concerns about 
“fundamental fairness.”58
For this reason, Harlan’s framework for analyzing procedural 
due process is worth a closer look.  He argued that the process due in 
juvenile proceedings should depend on three criteria:  
[F]irst, no more restrictions should be imposed than are 
imperative to assure the proceeding’s fundamental fairness; 
second, the restrictions which are imposed should be those 
which preserve, so far as possible, the essential elements of 
the State’s purpose; and finally, restrictions should be chosen 
which will later permit the orderly selection of any additional 
protections which ultimately prove necessary.  In this way, 
the Court may guarantee the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding, yet permit the State to continue development of 
an effective response to the problems of juvenile crime.59
Applying these criteria, Harlan would have required that those 
subjected to juvenile delinquency proceedings be afforded only the 
rights to notice, state-paid counsel if institutionalization was 
possible, and a written record maintained by the court.60  Although 
the majority obviously believed that these prescriptions were not 
enough, its reliance on the due process clause at least did not 
unalterably foreclose use of Harlan’s more flexible analysis. 
In Winship, the Supreme Court relied on the same hybrid 
formula it adopted in Gault.  As in Gault, the Court equated the adult 
and juvenile standards, but the basis of the decision was the due 
process clause (as it had to be, given the absence of any specific 
supporting constitutional language for either adults or juveniles61).  
The Court also emphasized that its holding with respect to juveniles 
would not have “any effect on the informality, flexibility, or speed of 
the hearing at which the factfinding takes place,” nor would it affect 
the informality of the pre-hearing or dispositional phases of the 
juvenile process.62  Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion 
58 Id. at 65-78 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring).
60 Id. at 72. 
61  This was the main complaint of Justice Black in dissent.  397 U.S. 
at 377 (Black, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 366.
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agreeing that any lesser standard of proof “offends the requirement 
of fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” and emphasizing the minimal impact that 
holding would have on the rest of the juvenile system.63
None of this should obscure the fact that these three decisions 
made the juvenile court look very similar to adult criminal court. In 
his dissent in Winship, Chief Justice Burger was not persuaded by the 
assurances in the majority and concurring opinions in that case.  He 
warned:
What the juvenile court system needs is not more but less of 
the trappings of legal procedure and judicial formalism; the 
juvenile court system requires breathing room and flexibility 
in order to survive ... I cannot regard it as a manifestation of 
progress to transform juvenile courts into criminal courts, 
which is what we are well on the way of accomplishing.  We 
can only hope the legislative response will not reflect our own 
by having these courts abolished.64
At the time these comments could have been read as somewhat 
hyperbolic. But, as outlined earlier in this article, a number of factors, 
including the Court’s caselaw, have brought Justice Burger’s forecast 
close to fruition.65
At the same time, the conceptual difference between the two 
procedural systems is real.  That much Burger helped make clear in 
joining McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,66 the decision that provided the 
strongest signal yet that the Supreme Court is serious about 
differentiating the legal bases for the adult and juvenile systems. 
Decided one year after Winship, McKeiver held that, in contrast to 
adults, juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial.67  As 
in Kent, Gault and Winship, instead of grounding its analysis in the 
constitutional text of the sixth amendment--which guarantees the 
right to public, jury trial in all criminal prosecutions--the Court 
63 Id. at 368-375 (Harlan, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
65 See also Richard E. Redding, Juveniles Transferred to Criminal Court: 
Legal Reform Proposals Based on Social Science Research, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 709, 
713 (1997) (noting that many States have amended the policy section of their 
juvenile code to emphasize punishment over rehabilitation).
66  403 U.S. 528 (1971).
67 Id. at 545.
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framed the issue in due process terms.68  The difference between 
McKiever and the Court’s other juvenile justice decisions is the extent 
to which it emphasized this point. 
Justice Blackmun’s plurality opinion began by stressing that 
Kent, Gault, and Winship had consciously refrained from equating 
juvenile delinquency and adult criminal proceedings.69  Then, in a 
more definitive tone than it had in the past, the Court asserted that 
the adequacy of procedural requirements in the context of 
delinquency adjudications should be assessed solely according to 
whether they measured “up to the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment.”70  Using this metric, the Court reasoned that because a 
jury is not necessary to obtain “accurate” results,71 and because of the 
need to maintain the “intimacy” of the juvenile proceeding and avoid 
the “clamor” of the adversarial process, the failure to provide juries 
to juveniles would not be fundamentally unfair.72  In language that 
sums up application of the due process model to juvenile court, the 
Court added:  “We are reluctant to disallow the States to experiment 
further and to seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to 
the problems of the young, and we feel that we would be impeding 
that experimentation by imposing the jury trial.”73
This crowning decision of the due process era in juvenile 
justice made clear that, despite the “adultification” of the juvenile 
court, Justice Harlan’s fundamental fairness theory had taken root.  
Yet legal scholars who recite that Gault ushered in an era in which 
juvenile offenders secured the procedural safeguards afforded adult 
criminal defendants tend to gloss over the fact that, with the 
exception of the right to silence, these safeguards were derived from 
68 Id. at 541 (“our task here with respect to trial by jury, as it was in 
Gault with respect to other claimed rights, ‘is to ascertain the precise impact 
of the due process requirement’”). 
69 Id. at 533 (“The Court, however, has not yet said that all rights 
constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime also are to be enforced 
or made available to the juvenile in his delinquency proceeding. Indeed, the 
Court specifically has refrained from going that far.”).
70 Id. at 533-34 (quoting from Kent, 383 U.S. at 562, and continuing 
“[t]he Court has insisted that these successive decisions do not spell the 
doom of the juvenile court system or even deprive it of its ‘informality, 
flexibility, or speed,’”quoting from Winship, 397 U.S. at 366).
71 Id. at 543. 
72 Id. at 545, 550
73 Id. at 547.
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the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.74  Beyond this 
nonchalant attitude toward the legal basis of the Court’s decision, 
there seems to be an assumption that the Court’s fundamental 
fairness theory is merely an artifact of its decision to exclude the 
juvenile justice system from the ambit of the “criminal prosecutions” 
mentioned in the sixth amendment.  In fact, however, this theory is 
entirely consistent with the Court’s adoption of a more flexible 
approach to procedural questions in other settings.
Part III:  Other Visions of Procedural Due Process
[T]he Supreme Court has yielded too readily to the notion 
that the adversary system is the only appropriate model and 
that there is only one acceptable solution to any problem, and 
consequently has been too prone to indulge in constitutional 
codification.  There is a need for experimentation, particularly 
for the use of the investigative model, for empirical studies, 
and for avoiding absolutes. 
From Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1267, 1316 (1975). 
Although Judge Friendly’s comments were foreshadowed by 
McKeiver, and could be seen as critical of Gault, they were not 
prompted by the Court’s juvenile justice decisions but rather were a 
reaction to developments in administrative law in the early 1970s.  In 
particular, Friendly’s criticism was aimed at Goldberg v. Kelly,75 a 1970 
Supreme Court decision about procedure in welfare cases that could 
be called the Gault of administrative law, because of its preference for 
the traditional adversarial model of dispute resolution.   Unlike 
Gault, however, Goldberg’s influence was short-lived.  In 1976, the 
year after Judge Friendly’s article was published, the Court decided 
74 Indeed, a number of articles, mostly by students, declare that 
Gault was based on the sixth amendment. David T. Huang, “Less Unequal 
Footing”: State Courts’ Per Se Rules for Juvenile Waivers During Interrogations 
and the Case for Their Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 437, 445 (2001) 
(“Gault unequivocally concluded that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
apply to juveniles with equal force as they do to adults.”). Yet the Court has 
clearly held otherwise. In McKeiver, five justices (the four-member plurality 
plus Justice Brennan) agreed that juvenile delinquency proceedings are not 
“criminal prosecutions,” see 403 at 541 (plurality opinion) & 553 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Justice Harlan appeared to 
agree as well, but did not do so explicitly. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., concurring in 
the judgment).
75  397 U.S. (1970).
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Mathews v. Eldridge,76 a case that has come to define modern trends 
toward administrative, as opposed to judicial, models of procedural 
justice. 
The due process revolution in juvenile justice is usefully 
compared to these parallel developments in the administrative/civil 
realm, because the latter developments reinforce the case for a 
fundamental fairness approach to juvenile justice that is not wedded 
to adult criminal procedure safeguards.  In its due process decisions 
involving adult administrative settings, the post-Mathews Court has 
definitively rejected a one-size-fits-all procedural model and instead 
seems to be following Judge Friendly’s injunction to experiment with 
different approaches.  Even in situations that involve significant 
deprivations of juveniles’ liberty and property, application of 
Mathews’ framework has produced decisions that resonate with 
Harlan’s and Friendly’s flexible approach, rather than with Gault’s
equation of procedural due process with the adult criminal trial.
A.  Due Process in the Administrative Setting
Before the 1970s, administrative decisionmaking, like 
decisionmaking in the juvenile process before 1966, was not a major 
concern of the Supreme Court.77  On those few occasions when the 
Court held that the Constitution required any process in such 
proceedings, it only demanded a little, “however brief” and 
“however informal.”78   Above all, the Court saw the due process 
inquiry as a flexible one, immortalized in Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath:
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced 
by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been 
evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional 
76  425 U.S. 319 (1976).
77 WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 142-44 
(1997) (explaining that the Supreme Court “did not seem particularly 
interested in questions of agency procedure throughout the first 100 years or 
so of our constitutional history,” then decided a few important cases in the 
early part of the twenty century, but subsequently merely “tinkered with 
agency due process over the next fifty years”).
78 Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (holding that 
a landowner was entitled to contest a city assessment not only in writing, as 
the city permitted, but also through a hearing where the landowner “shall 
have the right to support his allegations by argument, however brief; and, if 
need be, by proof, however informal”).
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history and civilization, 'due process' cannot be imprisoned 
within the treacherous limits of any formula. . . . Due process 
is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a 
process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably 
involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the 
Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process. . . .
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely 
affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for 
doing it, the available alternatives to the procedure that was 
followed, the protection implicit in the office of the 
functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt 
complained of and good accomplished-these are some of the 
considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment 79
This context-dependent due process analysis was seriously 
challenged, albeit only briefly and indirectly, with the Court’s 
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly.  In Goldberg--decided three years after 
Gault, the same term as Winship, and one year before McKeiver--the 
Supreme Court addressed the procedure for terminating a mother’s 
welfare benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
program.  The Court began somewhat ambivalently.  It agreed with 
the petitioner that some sort of pre-termination hearing was required 
because loss of benefits would put her in an “immediately desperate” 
situation.80  But it also stated that the hearing “need not take the form 
of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial.”81  Rather it need merely meet 
“minimum procedural safeguards, adapted to the particular 
characteristics of welfare recipients, and to the limited nature of the 
controversies to be resolved.”82 To this point, the opinion sounded 
like something Justice Harlan or Justice Frankfurter might have 
written. 
 But it soon became Gault-like.  The Court held that the 
“minimum” procedural requirements for carrying out benefits 
terminations were: (1) timely and adequate notice detailing the 
reasons for termination; (2) the opportunity to appear personally 
before the decision maker and present oral presentation of 
arguments and evidence (an entitlement the Court thought necessary 
given the likely difficulty many welfare recipients would have with 
written submissions and the usefulness of “mold[ing one’s] 
79  341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
80 397 U.S. at 264.
81 Id. at 266.
82 Id. at 267.
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argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as 
important”); (3) the opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses; (4) the right to retain an attorney at personal 
expense; (5) a statement by the decision maker indicating the reasons 
for the determination and the evidenced relied on; and (6) an 
impartial decision maker who was not involved in making the 
decision under review.83 The only adult criminal procedural 
safeguards missing from this list were the right to counsel at state 
expense and the right to a jury or written findings of fact.
Goldberg was roundly criticized, both within the Court and 
without, for imposing costly procedures on a simple decision.84  Yet 
the case led to what some commentators called a “due process 
explosion” throughout the early 1970s, lasting until the decision in 
Mathews.85  During this period courts tended to “judicialize” 
administrative decisionmaking procedures in any setting where 
individuals faced the potential loss of liberty or property, broadly 
defined, at the hands of a government actor.86  In essence, they 
treated due process more like a “mechanical instrument” than the 
“delicate process of adjustment” envisioned by Justice Frankfurter.
83 Id. at 267-71.
84 Judge Friendly’s opposition has already been noted. See Henry J. 
Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U.PA.L.REV. 1267, 1284-85, 1316 (1975). 
In Goldberg itself, Justice Black argued that the costly procedures required by 
the majority would reduce the funds available for welfare recipients and 
make welfare bureaucrats more reluctant to find poor individuals eligible 
for welfare.  397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting).  Professor Mashaw 
documented these concerns in a study he did of New York’s welfare system.  
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process:  Accuracy, Fairness and 
Timeliness in Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 
(1974). 
85  This phrase was first used by Judge Friendly, Friendly, supra note 
84, at 1267, and has been picked up by a number of commentators.  JERRY L. 
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 8-9 (1985); Fox, supra
note 77, at 144.  
86 See Friendly, supra note 84, at 1300-01; Richard J. Pierce, The Due 
Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1980 (1996)
(noting that the “combined effect” of Goldberg and other Court decisions 
between 1970 and 1972 was “to expand the scope of due process protection 
to encompass hundreds of new ‘property’ and ‘liberty’ interests” and that 
“Goldberg suggested that the government is required to provide a formal 
trial-type hearing before it could deprive anyone of any of the newly 
recognized constitutional interests . . .”).
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In the midst of this due process explosion, it was often 
forgotten that the Goldberg Court had, in theory at least, agreed with 
Justice Frankfurter about the need for due process to be context-
dependent.   The Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews six years later 
recognized as much, and took the principle very seriously.  Its 
emphasis on the flexible nature of due process ultimately put the 
brakes on the constitutional codification of traditional adversarial 
safeguards outside adult criminal setting.  
The issue in Mathews was whether Social Security disability 
benefits, as distinguished from the welfare benefits at issue in 
Goldberg, could be terminated without an evidentiary hearing.  Seven 
members of the Court concluded that no hearing is required in such 
situations.87  Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court first established 
that due process analysis requires consideration of the following 
three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government's interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.88
Applying this test, the Court found that termination of disability 
benefits was not as significant a hardship as termination of welfare 
benefits (because people with disabilities often have other sources of 
income);89 that adversarial procedures were not as important when 
the focus of the decision is objective medical evidence, as is the case 
with disability determinations;90 and that the costs of elaborate 
hearings “may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving.”91
Mathews’ three-part test, often described as requiring a 
balancing of fairness, accuracy, and efficiency considerations,92 has 
87  397 U.S. at 349.
88 Id. at 335.
89 Id. at 340-41.
90 Id. at 343-44.
91 Id. at 348.
92  See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for 
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a 
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
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provided the framework for most of the Supreme Court’s due 
process cases since the mid 1970s.93  The framework provides 
considerable latitude for informality and flexibility, and has now 
been applied to a wide variety of contexts.94 The contexts most 
relevant for our purposes are those involving juveniles.
B.  Juvenile Due Process in Non-Delinquency Settings
A precursor to Mathews by one year, but completely 
consistent with its approach, is the Supreme Court’s decision in Goss 
v. Lopez.95  There the Court held that a hearing is required before 
schools may subject students to suspensions of ten days or more, 
because without one the chance of an erroneous deprivation of the 
student’s entitlement to a public education is too high.96  However, 
the Court went on to conclude that the due process “hearing” need 
only consist of an informal meeting between the student and the 
relevant school official, at which the student is informed of the 
charge and is permitted to tell his or her side of the story; a judicial 
hearing, the Court noted, “might well overwhelm administrative 
facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more than 
it would save in educational effectiveness.”97   Despite the finding 
that the suspension involved a non-trivial property deprivation, the 
Court did not refer to Gault or any other juvenile justice decision.
Of course, a ten-day suspension from school is not 
comparable to the six-year commitment that faced Gerald Gault.  
Outside the delinquency context, the Supreme Court decision 
involving the most closely analogous situation to Gault is Parham v. 
93  We say “most” decisions, because for a time a segment of the 
Court seemed willing to ignore even the minimal requirements imposed by 
Mathews and adopt a position of complete deference to legislative 
decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 681 (1977) 
(holding that lack of procedure associated with paddling a student was the 
product of a “legislative judgment, rooted in history”).   However, in 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), the Court 
explicitly rejected that approach. 
94  See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 53 (1994). 
95  419 U.S. 565 (1975).
96 Id. at 580 (“the risk of error is not at all trivial”).
97 Id. at 582-83.
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J.R., 98 decided three years after Mathews. There, the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether an adversarial proceeding was 
required prior to a juvenile’s civil commitment to a state psychiatric 
facility by the juvenile’s parents or guardians.  The three-judge 
federal district court, relying on Gault, held that due process in the 
juvenile commitment context required adequate notice and an 
adversary-type pre-deprivation hearing before an impartial judicial 
or quasi-judicial body.99   But the Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that due process was satisfied simply by an evaluation from a neutral 
factfinder, who can be the admitting psychiatrist.100  Thus, Chief 
Justice Burger concluded for six members of the Court, if the parents 
or guardian seek admission and the neutral evaluator determines 
that evidence of mental illness exists and that the child is suitable for 
treatment, the child may be admitted to a psychiatric facility.101
In justifying this decision, the Court used Mathews’ three-
factor balancing test, looking at the first and third factors (the private 
interest at stake and efficiency) before examining the second, risk of 
error, factor.  The Court conceded that civil commitment of a minor 
implicates the juvenile’s constitutionally protected liberty interest.102
However, the Court reasoned that this liberty interest was qualified 
by and coupled with the parental interest in the child’s well-being.  
While recognizing that parents do not always act in their child’s best 
interests, the Court was willing to assume that they normally do, an 
assumption which weighed against highly formal procedures when 
parents seek care for their children.103   The Court also agreed with 
the state’s argument that adversarial proceedings were an inefficient 
means of meeting its goals, by noting the benefits of speedy care, the 
need to minimize the time mental health professionals spend in 
98  442 U.S. 584 (1979).
99 Id. at 596-98 & n.7.
100 Id. at 607 (holding that “a staff physician will suffice, so long as 
he or she is free to evaluate independently the child's mental and emotional 
condition and need for treatment.”).
101  This was the outcome permitted by the decision, see id., 
although the Court did not directly address the substantive criteria for 
commitment, only the appropriate procedures.
102 Id. at 600.
103  Id. at 601-04 (concluding “that our precedents permit the parents 
to retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a 
finding of neglect or abuse, and that the traditional presumption that the 
parents act in the best interests of their child should apply.”).
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admission proceedings, and the concern that the costs of 
“hundreds—or even thousands—of hearings each year . . . would 
come from the public monies the legislature intended for mental 
health care.”104
Finally, the Court was not convinced that adversarial 
procedures were needed to reduce the risk of erroneous 
commitment, and even suggested it might increase it.   The 
commitment decision, the Court reasoned, is primarily a medical, not 
a legal, judgment and thus less in need of adversarial testing.105  The 
majority even went so far as to suggest that the benefits of using 
adversary proceedings to assure decision making accuracy in this 
setting were “more illusory than real.”106   Furthermore, such 
proceedings might pit parent against child, or the child against his or 
her eventual therapist, which would bode ill for both relationships.107
Thus, the Court was “satisfied that an independent medical 
decisionmaking process, which includes [a] thorough psychiatric 
investigation  . . . followed by additional periodic review of a child’s 
conditions, will protect children who should not be admitted; we do 
not believe the risks of error in that process would be significantly 
reduced by a more formal, judicial-type hearing.”108   The Court saw 
no need for either a judge or a lawyer to be involved in the process. 
Although Goss and Parham are often characterized by critics 
as cases that deny due process protections to juveniles,109 both 
decisions did in fact address issues at the heart of due process 
doctrine: truthseeking and fairness.  For example, the comprehensive 
evaluation required in Parham, which the Court stated should 
“carefully probe the child’s background using all available sources, 
including, but not limited to, parents, schools, and other social 
agencies [and] an interview with the child,” is clearly aimed at 
104 Id. at 605-06.
105 Id. at 607-09.
106 Id. at 609.
107 Id. at 610.
108 Id. at 613.
109 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 
LOY U. CHI. L.J. 111, 130 (2004) (criticizing Goss); Michael L. Perlin, An 
Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice Warren Burger's 
“Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 149, 291 (1981) (criticizing Parham). 
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promoting decisionmaking accuracy.110  Moreover, although the 
child subject to commitment does not have the right to call or cross 
examine witnesses, he or she is provided with some “opportunity to 
be heard” through the required face-to-face interview, a procedure 
which Goss also mandates for students subject to possible 
suspension.  At the same time, consistent with the framework 
outlined in Mathews, in neither case was the Court concerned solely 
with issues of accuracy and fairness of decisionmaking; it also 
explicitly addressed the government’s interest in the efficient use of 
public resources.  Thus, as noted above, in Goss the Court was 
worried about a “diversion of resources” if it required more elaborate 
procedures, and in Parham it likewise favored an investigative model 
over a legal adversary process in part to ensure mental health 
professionals spend most of their time treating youngsters in need 
rather than testifying in legal proceedings.
Parham is a particularly important decision for this discussion 
about juvenile justice, because it dealt with civil commitment.  Civil 
commitment can result in a serious deprivation of liberty that can 
often be as intrusive and as long in duration as the detention 
experienced by juveniles charged with felony offenses,111 yet the 
procedure outlined in Parham is a far cry from that endorsed in Gault.  
That observation raises what, for us, is a central question.   Which 
procedural approach makes the most sense from the standpoint of 
promoting fair and accurate decision making, public safety, and the 
well-being of children under the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice 
system:  the adversarial procedural framework outlined in Gault or 
110 Id. at 606-07.
111  The average length of civil commitment has shortened 
considerably in the past decade, to fewer than 45 days.  See RALPH REISNER 
ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS
814 (4th ed. 2004).  However, perhaps 25% of those committed stay in the 
hospital for over four years.  Id. 
The majority in Parham did recognize that juveniles who are 
committed are entitled to periodic review, id. at 617, and Justice Brennan 
argued that such review should be more adversarial in nature.  Id. at 633-34 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  However, the 
majority refused to address this issue in any greater detail, stating simply 
“we have no basis for determining whether the review procedures of the 
various hospitals are adequate to provide the process called for or what 
process might be required if a child contests his confinement by requesting a 
release.” Id. at 617. Thus, as it stands, the staff physician procedure that is 
adequate for initial admission may be adequate for periodic review as well.
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the investigative framework outlined in Parham and inspired by 
Mathews?  
We believe that, whatever the merits of Gault at the time it 
was decided, today the investigative model informed by the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Parham and Mathews holds the greater 
promise for promoting these goals.  We are not suggesting that the 
specific procedures permitted in Parham (much less in Goss) be 
mechanically transplanted to the context of delinquency 
adjudications.   But we are arguing that the Mathews-inspired 
investigative approach in Parham and Goss is far more promising as a 
means of achieving a fundamentally fair system.  To live up to that 
promise, the procedural framework guiding the juvenile justice 
system must be informed by modern social psychological research 
aimed at understanding and promoting fairness, accuracy and 
efficiency. 
IV.  Contributions from Social Science:
Social Psychological Research on Procedural Justice
Recent due process cases have insisted on a multi-factor 
balancing analysis that places as much emphasis on the risk of 
reducing error, the “value” of procedural safeguards, and systemic 
efficiency as it does on liberty and property interests. Although some 
due process traditionalists find this trend alarming, social and 
behavioral scientists, many of them with legal training, are 
producing social psychological research that suggests this type of 
balancing analysis may come closer to achieving “just” procedures 
than a rigid adherence to the adversarial model. In particular, 
research on “procedural justice” points to several ways in which non-
adversarial methods may be superior to the traditional adult criminal 
procedural safeguards in certain settings.
The study of procedural justice in the social sciences largely 
traces its roots to the pioneering work of John Thibaut, Laurens 
Walker, and their colleagues in the 1970s.  This group coined the 
procedural justice term to refer to the social psychological effects of 
varying decision-making procedures, particularly with respect to the 
effects these procedural variations have on fairness judgments.112  In 
their groundbreaking work, Procedural Justice:  A Pyschological 
112 See John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. 
REV. 1271, 1289 (1974).
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Analysis,113 Thibaut and Walker used empirical methods to explore 
differences between the adversary model followed by American 
courts (where the parties are responsible for producing evidence) 
and the inquisitorial model employed by courts in many European 
countries (where the judge or a judicial delegate takes on the 
investigative role). 
In carrying out this research, Thibaut and Walker addressed 
both “objective” and “subjective” aspects of procedural justice.  As 
defined by Allan Lind (a sometime colleague of Thibaut and 
Walker’s) and Tom Tyler, objective procedural justice is concerned 
with "the capacity of a procedure to conform to the normative 
standards of justice, to make either the decisions themselves or the 
decision-making process more fair by, for example, reducing some 
clearly unacceptable bias or prejudice."114  Thus, objective aspects of 
procedural justice include accuracy of outcome and the collection 
and use of available information.  Subjective procedural justice, in 
contrast, concerns the "capacity of each procedure to enhance the 
fairness judgments of those who encounter the procedures."115  Here 
the perceptions of the participants are the important focal point. The 
following discussion begins with a description of findings from 
Thibaut and Walker and others concerning subjective procedural 
justice, and then examines empirical findings relevant to objective 
procedural justice.  These two aspects of social science research 
roughly correspond to the fairness and accuracy considerations 
identified in Mathews.  The discussion in this part ends with a brief 
comment on how social science can also address the efficiency prong 
of the Mathews analysis. 
A.  Subjective Procedural Justice/Fairness
One of the most significant findings of Thibaut and Walker's 
early research was that satisfaction with dispute outcomes is 
substantially affected by factors other than winning or losing the 
dispute.116  Thus, even those who fail to prevail on their claim 
113 JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PYSCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
114 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 3 (1988). 
115 Id. at 3-4.
116 See, e.g., THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 113, at 80 (reporting a 
study finding that adversary representation produced “greater satisfaction 
of the involved parties with the judgment, quite independently of both the 
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nonetheless exhibit greater outcome satisfaction and express greater 
willingness to accept the decision when the procedures used to reach 
the decision are perceived as fair.  "This finding,” Lind and Tyler have 
noted, “showed that it is possible, by judicious choice and design of 
procedures, to enhance the quality of social life without increasing 
the outcomes available for distribution under the procedures."117  As 
Thibaut and Walker themselves explained, subjective justice is 
"crucial because one of the major aims of the legal process is to 
resolve conflicts in such a way as to bind up the social fabric and 
encourage the continuation of productive exchange between 
individuals."118  In short, subjective procedural justice is an important  
means of getting both litigants and society at large to buy into the 
decisions that resolve disputes. 
Thibaut and Walker's early work, reported in the mid-1970s, 
suggested that both disputants and the public preferred the 
adversary system to the inquisitorial system, because they perceived 
the former system’s procedures to be fairer.  More specifically, 
Thibaut and Walker found that their research participants felt the 
adversarial mode gave them more decision control (ability to 
“unilaterally determine the outcome” of the case) and process control
(ability to determine “the development and selection of 
information”), and particularly more of the latter.119 These 
perceptions of fairness, in turn, led to a greater willingness to accept 
verdicts arrived at through adversary procedures rather than those 
that resulted from an inquisitorial process, 120 a preference shared 
even by individuals from countries with inquisitorial systems.121
Thibaut and Walker’s findings in this regard were 
compromised, however, by the fact that they generally tested only 
favorableness of the judgment and the participants’ beliefs concerning the 
issue under adjudication.”). 
117 Lind & Tyler, supra note 114, at 26.
118 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 113, at 67.
119 John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. 
REV. 541, 546 (1978).
120 Id. at 547.  See generally, THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 113, at 118 
(“It is perhaps the main finding of the body of our research, therefore, that 
for litigation the class of procedures commonly called `adversary’ is clearly 
superior.”).
121 Id., at ch. 8 (respondents in four countries—the U.S., France, West 
Germany and Great Britain—all preferred the adversarial process to the 
inquisitorial process). 
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“pure” models of adversarial and inquisitorial systems.  As they 
described these models,  “in a pure adversary system, openly biased 
advocates urge their clients’ cases before a passive decision maker,” 
while a “pure inquisitorial system” involves “an expert decision 
maker [who] actively investigates the claims of unrepresented 
litigants.”122  In other words, Thibaut and Walker’s pure inquisitorial 
model prevented disputants (or their representatives) from 
presenting their own view of the facts unencumbered by interference 
from the decisionmaker.123
More recent research, often using less rigid depictions of the 
two models, calls into question Thibaut and Walker’s conclusions 
about adversarial and inquisitorial procedures. For instance, 
subsequent research directly contradicted their finding that culture 
does not affect preferences for certain procedures.124  Furthermore, a 
number of studies have challenged the finding that Americans prefer 
the adversarial process.   Based on this second generation of research, 
Lind and Tyler concluded that “pure” adversarial and inquisitorial 
procedures both have something to offer in terms of subjective 
procedural justice, and that policymakers “should be able to design a 
variety of hybrid procedures that engender high[er] levels of 
perceived fairness.”125
A brief accounting of some of this newer research 
demonstrates the type of hybrid procedures that might be perceived 
as fairer than either of the pure forms.  For example, Blair Sheppard 
conducted two studies in which participants were offered four, 
122 John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal 
Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386, 388 (1972).
123 For a summary of the criticism of Thibaut & Walker's use of 
"pure" adversarial and inquisitorial models, see Blair H. Sheppard, Justice is 
No Simple Matter:  The Case for Elaborating Our Model of Procedural Fairness, 49 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953, 953-55 (1985).  
124 Rebecca A. Anderson & Amy L. Otto, Perceptions of Fairness in the 
Justice System:  A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 31 SOCIAL BEH. & PERSONALITY
557 (2003) (reporting a study of Dutch and Americans finding that 
participants showed a clear preference for their own country’s procedures);  
Kwok Leung, Cross-Cultural Study of Procedural Fairness and Disputing 
Behavior, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 898, 903 (1987) (finding that 
Chinese preferred mediation to adversarial procedures and preferred 
bargaining and inquisitorial adjudication substantially less, and that 
Americans were ambivalent about which of the first two procedures they 
preferred).
125 LIND & TYLER, supra note 114 , at 117.
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rather than two, procedural options: an inquisitorial procedure that 
involved a single investigator; an inquisitorial procedure that 
involved two investigators (one for each side of the dispute); a pure 
adversary procedure; and a hybrid procedure that allowed the 
disputants to present their evidence and arguments but also allowed 
the judge to ask questions and seek clarification.126  He found that 
while the subjects preferred the adversary procedure to the two 
inquisitorial procedures, the great majority preferred the hybrid 
procedure above any of the other three, apparently because they 
perceived it as the most fair.127
A similar study, conducted by Norman Poythress and his 
colleagues, asked mental health professionals to compare the 
adversarial process to a number of hybrid alternatives in the context 
of a simulated medical malpractice scenario.128  One hybrid involved 
the exclusive use of court-appointed medical experts subject to cross-
examination by the parties.  A second hybrid hypothesized a court-
appointed research psychologist who surveyed experts in the field as 
to their evaluation of various diagnoses and treatments relevant to 
the facts of the case.129  The adversarial model, in contrast, relied on 
the parties to find and examine the experts. Participants evaluated 
these alternatives in terms of their preference for the procedure and 
its perceived fairness, among other variables.130
Results revealed that each of the hybrid procedures compared 
favorably with the adversarial procedures in almost all respects. The 
hybrids fared significantly better in terms of perceived accuracy, 
process control, fairness, satisfaction regardless of outcome, control 
of outcome, and overall preference.131   The adversarial model was 
rated most favorably only with respect to “voice” (involvement in 
126 Sheppard, supra note 123, at  356-57.  Thibaut and Walker 
conducted a similar study, using these four models plus a fifth, bargaining 
model, but did not provide disputants with the ability to present their own 
side of the case in any of the inquisitorial conditions. Thibaut et al., supra
note 112, at 1275-79 & n. 25. 
127 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 114, at 87.
128  Norman Poythress et al., Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of 
Fairness and Compliance with Outcomes: A Study of Alternatives to the Standard 
Adversary Trial Procedure, 18 LAW & HUM. BEH. 361 (1994).
129 Id. at 363.
130 Id. at 365.  
131 Id. at 373.
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the process).132   As Poythress and his colleagues noted, while this 
latter finding reflected “the relatively unbridled control over case 
presentation with that model, subjects’ consistent assignment of 
more favorable ratings to hybrid models on other dimensions 
suggests a willingness to relinquish some of that control in return for 
the enhancement of other procedural justice attributes."133
Accordingly, the results suggested that “there are variations in the 
standard adversarial trial procedures that will permit us to optimize 
all criteria for a just system and escape the dilemma of a system that 
purchases fairness at the expense of  (objective and subjective) 
accuracy.”134
Donna Shestowsky’s recent research regarding preferences 
for dispute resolution methods arrived at similar results.135  Noting 
that, due to the growth of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
such as mediation, the "legal landscape has changed remarkably" 
since Thibaut and Walker's work in the 1970s, Shestowsky conducted 
three experiments designed to investigate preferences for  
“nonadjudicative” as well as “adjudicative” procedures.136  All of the 
experiments involved a claim for damages.137  In order, they 
investigated whether preferences for a given procedural model were 
influenced by (1) the relative status of the disputants (in terms of age 
and standing in the community); (2) the party's role in a dispute 
(plaintiff or defendant) where the facts favored one side; and (3) the 
party's role in a dispute in which the facts were equally favorable to 
both the defendant and plaintiff.138
Shestowsky found that participants' preferences for 
procedures were consistent across all the three experiments.  Of 
particular interest here, she found that, regardless of condition, fewer 
than ten percent of the participants rated adjudicative procedures 
(involving a judge as decisionmaker and lawyers for both sides) as 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 373.
134 Id. at 375.
135 Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: A Close, Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & L. 
211 (2004).
136 Id. at 213, 230-231.  
137 Id. at 246.
138 Id. at  230; 239.
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their preferred method of dispute resolution. 139  She also found that, 
across all conditions, disputants preferred “direct control over the 
presentation of evidence (rather than using a representative to do 
so).”140 Again, these results, which are representative of a 
considerable body of research,141 contrast with the early findings of 
Thibaut and Walker, who found, using “pure” adversarial and 
inquisitorial models, that participants are partial to adversarial 
procedures and lawyers.  
These three studies concluding that hybrid procedures are 
preferred to the pure adversarial and inquisitorial models are all 
subject to methodological criticism.  For instance, the participants in 
Shestowsky’s study were Stanford students, who might have felt 
more comfortable than many others would representing 
themselves.142  And in all three studies, the stakes involved were 
minimal, meaning their results might not be generalizable to criminal 
prosecutions and similar types of disputes.143  Finally, all three 
139 Id. at 246 (“Configurations that would represent an adjudicative 
model (one in which a neutral third-party makes a binding decision, each 
party has a lawyer who presents evidence, and the rules of law apply) did 
not obtain a first choice rating by even 10% of the participants in any of the 
experiments.”).
140 Id. at 240.
141 Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice Research, 1 SOC. JUSTICE RESEARCH
41, 45 (1987) (summarizing the research by concluding that  “[o]ften, 
. . . litigants' conceptions of fair process differ from the need to have a 
formal trial and can be accommodated in informal dispute resolution 
settings.”). See also William Austin et al., Effect of Mode of Adjudication, 
Presence of Defense Counsel, and Favorability of Verdict on Observers' Evaluation 
of a Criminal Trial, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 281, 297 (1981) (finding that 
criminal defendants are least satisfied when an adjudicative procedure 
yields an unfavorable outcome, contradicting previous studies that had 
suggested that adjudicative procedures are the most preferred dispute 
resolution procedure within all outcome conditions).
142 Shestowsky, supra  note 135, at 239. 
143 The scenario in Shestowsky’s study involved damage to a $800 
bicycle, see id. at 240, while Poythress’ hypothetical involved a psychiatric 
malpractice suit, posed to mental health professionals, Poythress et al., supra
note 128, at 366, and Sheppard questioned undergraduates and airport 
passengers.  Sheppard, supra note 123, at 956-57. However, other studies 
producing similar results have been more closely related to the criminal 
setting.  See Leung, supra note 124, at 903 (using a reckless driving scenario 
resulting in physical injury in a study finding no strong preference for 
adversarial over mediation procedures); Austin et al., supra note 141  
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studies were conducted in the “laboratory,” using mock scenarios, 
not disputants involved in actual cases (an external validity 
complaint that is also true, it should be noted, of Thibaut and 
Walker’s work144).  At the least, however, this type of research calls 
into question the latter’s findings that adversarial procedures are 
superior from a subjective procedural justice perspective. 
Surveys of those who have actually experienced differing 
types of dispute resolution in the criminal process also challenge that 
conclusion.  A “meta-analysis” of such surveys, some of which 
involved offenders charged with very serious crimes, found that 
victim-offender mediation and family conferencing (often with no 
judges or lawyers involved) were consistently more successful than 
traditional criminal justice in fostering defendants’ perceptions of 
fairness (with 91% of offenders whose cases were handled in 
mediation finding the process fair, versus 78% of those whose cases 
were handled by a court).145  Similar differences were found in terms 
of defendants’ satisfaction with the handling of their cases (84% to 
73%); their perception that they had an opportunity to tell their 
stories (88% versus 64%); their perception that their opinions were 
adequately considered (72% versus 55%); their assessment of the 
decisionmaker’s fairness (91% versus 63%); and their satisfaction 
with the outcome (77% versus 67%).146  The differential in victims’ 
reaction to nonadjudicative and adjudicative procedures was 
generally even more marked, again in favor of the former.147
(survey of criminal defendants finding dissatisfaction with adversarial 
process when outcome is unfavorable).
144 See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 113, at 4 (“we have made no 
attempt to reproduce the richness of variety and detail that exist in the 
courtroom and elsewhere in the legal process.  Therefore, our settings do 
not—and do not attempt to—represent in any complete way the settings to 
which applications can be made.  Nor do our subjects faithfully represent 
the personae of the courtroom.  With few exceptions, we have studied 
university students—from the undergraduate college and the law school.”)
145 Barton Poulson, A Third Voice:  A Review of Empirical Research on 
the Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 179-80 
(table 1).
146 Id. at 181-93 (tables 2-9).
147 Id. at 179-93 (tables 1-9).   Many of the studies described in this 
meta-analysis involved random assignment.  Id. at 169-70. In some, 
however, parties chose mediation or refused it; the former group therefore 
may have been predisposed to see mediation as beneficial. 
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Both experimental research and participant surveys suggest 
that alternatives to the traditional adversarial procedure are often 
perceived as more fair and as more accurate.   Whether the latter 
perception is correct has also been the subject of empirical study.
B.  Objective Procedural Justice/Accuracy
Objective procedural justice aims at constructing procedures 
that promote accurate decisionmaking.  A major challenge to 
evaluating objective justice, of course, is the criterion variable:  when 
is a decision accurate?  As Lind and Tyler asked, “how is one to 
know which defendants are truly guilty or innocent?"148 Perhaps 
because of these methodological difficulties, the research on objective 
procedural justice is decidedly less robust, and thus less definitive, 
than the research on subjective procedural justice. Even Thibaut and 
Walker conceded, however, that what they called “autocratic” 
procedure, in which both process and decision control is delegated to 
a third party, “is most likely to produce truth.”149  Their continued 
preference for the adversary model stemmed from their belief that 
“the fundamental objective of the legal process” is not “the discovery 
of truth” or “the realization of the most accurate view of reality,” but 
rather “the attainment of distributive justice,” which they asserted 
the adversary system, with its requirement that the parties present 
their own view of the evidence, is most likely to achieve.150
These conclusions were derived primarily from examinations 
of the ability of adversarial and inquisitorial procedures to reduce 
bias and increase the amount and accuracy of information used by 
the decision maker.  Thibaut & Walker produced the groundbreaking 
research in this area as well, and much of it did appear to favor the 
adversarial process.  For instance, one of their studies found that 
subjects who were exposed to new evidence using adversarial 
procedures relied less on their existing biases than participants in the 
inquisitorial condition.151  In another study, this time with Lind as 
their colleague, they found that, while law students acting as 
attorneys usually gathered about the same number of facts regardless 
of whether they were placed in an adversarial or inquisitorial role, 
148 LIND & WALKER, supra note 114, at 19.
149 Thibaut & Walker, supra note 113, at 547.
150 Id. at 556.
151 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 113, ch. 6.  See also, John Thibaut 
et. al., supra note 122, at 397.
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attorneys in the adversarial condition engaged in a more thorough 
investigation of the facts when the evidence was unfavorable to the 
attorneys' clients.152
Their research did not all point one direction, however.  First, 
Lind and Tyler have noted that, contrary to the conclusion one might 
draw from the finding reported just above, “there is no real evidence 
in the original experiment that inquisitorial procedures suffer from 
premature cessation of investigation.”153  More importantly, a third 
Thibaut, Walker & Lind study, which used the same methodology as 
the latter study but examined the accuracy of the facts presented 
produced results that were not supportive of the adversarial process.  
This study found that when the evidence favored the client or was 
balanced, attorneys in both conditions presented evidence that 
reflected the facts of the case.  When the facts weighed against the 
client, however, the adversarial attorneys were much more likely to 
present biased evidence, creating the impression that the facts were 
more evenly balanced than they were.154
This research suggested that inquisitorial procedures may 
result in the presentation of more accurate and less biased 
information.155 To test these propositions further, Sheppard and 
Vidmar studied the effect of adversarial and inquisitorial procedures 
on the preparation of witnesses and their impact on the 
decisionmaker, using students as lawyers, witnesses and judges.156
They found that, while witness biasing did not occur in the 
inquisitorial condition, "adversary procedures create lawyer role 
demands that in turn may result in the biasing of witness 
testimony."157 Additionally, the data suggested that the biased 
testimony influenced the decisionmaker.158  A second study by 
152 Id.   
153 LIND & TYLER, supra note 114, at 114.
154 THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 113, at ch. 5. 
155 As Lind and Walker point out, “[o]ne interpretation of the results 
of this study might be that the inquisitorial procedure leads to better 
information gathering and presentation.” LIND & WALKER, supra note 114, at 
25.  
156 Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures 
and Testimonial Evidence: effects of Laywer’s Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320 (1980).
157 Id. at 329.
158 Id.
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Vidmar and Laird found that bias may be produced simply by 
labeling a witness the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s.  This research 
found that witnesses subtly varied phrasing of their testimony 
depending on whether the plaintiff, the defendant or the court called 
them, enough so that a three-judge panel, while perceiving the 
witness appointed by the court to be “neutral,” were more likely to 
find for the plaintiff when the witness testified for the plaintiff, and 
for the defendant when the witness was called by the defendant.159
As with much of the research on subjective procedural justice, 
the generalizability of this experimental work to the real world can 
be questioned.  But impressionistic evidence from observers of our 
justice system supports the surmise that the adversarial process 
obstructs access to evidence and produces biased information, 
especially as it operates in the criminal justice system.  American 
prosecutors are routinely blamed for failing to disclose exculpatory 
evidence or information that could be used to challenge the 
credibility of witnesses.160 Defense attorneys commonly raise 
obstructionist objections and introduce questionable evidence in an 
effort to create reasonable doubt.161  In contrast, in more inquisitorial 
systems such as those in many European countries, the practice of 
judicial investigation substantially reduces the pressure on the 
parties to produce or withhold evidence or to win a case.162
159 Neil Vidmar & N.M. Laird, Adversary Social Roles:  Their Effects on 
Witnesses’ Communicationof Evidence and the Assessment of Adjudicators, 44 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 888 (1983).  It should be noted, however, that 
this study did not involve a witness testifying for the other side, which 
might have reduced the biasing effect. 
160 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for 
Brady Violations, 65 N.C. L.REV. 693, 697-703, 720-30 (1987) (cataloguing 
scores of instances in which prosecutors failed to turn over exculpatory 
evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, but only nine cases in which 
discipline was considered and only two which resulted in serious sanction). 
161 One judge is particularly adamant in making this claim.  HAROLD 
J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 141 (1995) (“Given 
the probability that the defendant is guilty, the defense attorney knows that 
the defendant will win only if counsel is successful in preventing the truth 
from being disclosed--or, failing that, misleading the jury once it is 
disclosed. So, when the defendant is guilty, the defense attorney's role is to 
prevent, distort, and mislead.”).  
162  Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 
123 U. PA.L. REV. 1083, 1093 n. 22  (1975) (Under an adversary model, “the 
adversaries are often reluctant to exchange information about the evidence 
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Coaching of witnesses is unethical,163 and the evidence produced 
does not depend on prosecutorial whim or the energy or resources of 
the defense.164  On objective measures as well, the adversarial system 
may not provide the optimal procedure. 
C.  Efficiency
Research providing statistical information is likely to have its 
most conspicuous impact in connection with this third prong of the 
Mathews test.  The costs of certain procedures, both in terms of direct 
expenditures on the process and in terms of the monies thereby 
diverted from other parts of the system is, in theory at least, more 
quantifiable than either subjective or objective justice.   Social science 
can therefore make contributions here as well.  
Unfortunately, to date, there appear to be no studies directly 
comparing the costs of inquisitorial, adversarial, and hybrid 
procedures in a given legal setting. But the Supreme Court’s 
assumption, in cases like Mathews and Parham, that adversarial 
procedures are more expensive is not unreasonable, especially if such 
procedures include the jury trial.   Indeed, it may be because of its 
expense that America’s adversarial process is rarely used,165 and 
instead relies primarily on plea bargaining, which is itself 
inquisitorial in nature.166
discovered, while the nonadversary agency entrusted with preparation of 
the case for trial will, as a rule, transmit all it has unearthed to the court.”).
163 Id. at 1088-89 (In a nonadversary system, “[t]he parties are not 
supposed to try to affect, let alone to prepare, the witnesses' testimony at 
trial. ‘Coaching’ witnesses comes dangerously close to various criminal 
offenses of interfering with the administration of justice.”).
164 See generally, Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction 
and Two Models of Criminal Procedure:  A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA.L. REV. 
506, 582 (1973) (“ An official inquiry must . . . disregard possible interparty 
arrangements, and pursue the search for the real truth.”).
165 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
LAWYERING 469 (2d ed. 1994) (citing studies showing that 90-95% of all civil
and criminal cases are settled rather than tried).
166  Gerald E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining:  Exactly What 
Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN.L.REV. 1399, 1404 (2003) (“the defining 
characteristic of the existing ‘plea bargaining’ system is that it is an informal, 
administrative, inquisitorial process of adjudication, internal to the 
prosecutor's office--in absolute distinction from a model of adversarial 
determination of fact and law before a neutral judicial decision maker.”).
Note, however, that an inquisitorial system can be inefficient and expensive 
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Another cost that should be factored into the efficiency 
calculus is the extent to which parties to the dispute can afford the 
process.  Privately financed evidence collection, which is the 
hallmark of the adversarial system, may discriminate against the 
poor.  In an inquisitorial system, on the other hand, the 
judge/decisionmaker is responsible for developing the evidence and 
can be of significant assistance to an indigent defendant.167
All of this is speculative.  But, as with the research on 
subjective and objective justice, these comments about efficiency call 
into question the superiority of the adversarial process.
V.  Integrating Law and Social Science in Pursuit of Fundamental 
Fairness: Toward a Performance-Based System of Juvenile Justice
The upshot of the procedural justice research is that the 
automatic equation of adversarial procedures and “fairness” or 
accuracy is not warranted. It may well be that, in some settings, 
alternatives to a process in which parties represented by counsel are 
responsible for providing and challenging evidence better promote 
both subjective and objective justice, and will often cost less as well.   
The central question raised by this article is whether the juvenile 
delinquency proceeding is one of those settings.
Unfortunately, we cannot answer that question here.  
Although the research we have briefly surveyed suggests that the 
procedures that many consider the gold standard of due process do 
not deserve that status, it only begins to answer the inquiry.  Since no 
research focusing on various alternatives in the juvenile justice 
setting exists, we would be foolish to suggest otherwise.
The point we can make, one that is a predicate for answering 
the above question, is that decisions about fundamental fairness 
should be performance-based and management-oriented.  By that we 
mean to endorse the following basic tenets:
as well.  See Marcus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargaining, German Lay 
Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 558-81 
(1997)(explaining inefficiencies of German criminal procedure).
167  See Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial 
Gamesmanship Toward the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
STORIES     (Carol Steiker, ed. 2005)(“Appointed defense counsel are often 
chronically underfunded, overworked, and of uneven competence. . . . Thus, 
defendants would . . . prefer a quasi-inquisitorial system, with a neutral 
magistrate who is charged with digging up the truth.”).
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1.  Consistent with Mathews, procedures should be 
constructed so as to promote individual and public 
perceptions of fairness, accurate decisionmaking, and the 
efficient use of available resources in a way that optimizes 
fairness and accuracy.
2.  The best method of determining whether specific 
procedures meet this goal is through ongoing feedback, 
evaluation and reform, both in individual cases and 
systemically, in the experimental spirit endorsed by Judge
Friendly.
3.  A mechanism that can manage this evaluation process 
must exist. 
The application of these tenets to juvenile justice requires, 
first and foremost, that questions about the appropriate procedure in 
the juvenile justice system be recast into empirical hypotheses rather 
than framed, as they have been up to now, by reference to adult 
criminal procedure requirements.  Whether decisionmaking accuracy 
and fairness are best promoted by a judge, a hearing officer, or a 
layperson; multiple or single decisionmakers; and the rights to cross-
examination, silence and the assistance of counsel are all empirical 
questions.  
Of course, these questions are pertinent in the adult criminal 
setting as well.  A fundamental fairness/performance-based 
approach to answering them requires, as Justices Harlan and 
Frankfurter emphasized, that any special attributes of the setting in 
question be taken into account.  In the juvenile justice context, these 
special aspects might include the facts that juveniles tend to be 
dependent on and under the authority of others, are less likely than 
adults to be competent to make the types of decisions that arise in the 
legal arena,168 and are less willing than adults to reveal their thoughts 
and feelings.169  Taking these considerations into account, we should 
168 Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, 
Due Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 797 
(2005)(reporting a recent study by the MacArthur Foundation that “found a 
high risk of trial incompetence among younger teens and even mid-
adolescents using the measures applied to adults.”).
169 GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE 
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS
429 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that a “common problem” among juvenile 
offenders is that they “ ‘clam up’, or, alternatively, try to present themselves 
as streetwise ‘tough guys,’ lest clinicians conclude that they are crazy [or 
weak].”).
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be open to the possibility that juveniles charged with crime will 
respond better to “social-worker” judges than distant, passive 
decisionmakers, and that informal hearings are more likely than 
public, jury trials to produce an environment conducive to obtaining 
relevant adjudicative and dispositional facts.170  We should also be 
willing to contemplate the possibilities that party control of evidence 
obfuscates rather than clarifies,171 that rigorous cross-examination is 
not the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth,”172 and that unfamiliar defense counsel and rules of evidence 
curb juveniles’ ability to tell their story.173
Finally, in a performance-based management system the 
spirit of ongoing evaluation and feedback characterizes not only the 
evaluation of the decisionmaking procedures, but also assessment of 
170  The Honorable Anthony J. Sciolino, The Changing Role of the 
Family Court Judge: New Ways of Stemming the Tide, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y 
& ETHICS J. 395, 399 (2005) (endorsing a process involving “(1) speaking 
directly to the defendant rather than defense counsel; (2) working 
collaboratively with a treatment team; (3) being a proactive participant in a 
non-adversarial process; (4) applying a direct, immediate and personal 
approach to each . . . offender; and (5) recognizing success with praise, 
applause, rewards, or a graduation ceremony in the courtroom.”).
171  Cf. TYLER & LIND, supra note 114, at 114 (countering Thibaut & 
Walker’s argument that the adversarial process enhances distributive justice 
through helping “disadvantaged” litigants by noting that the 
“disadvantage” is often simply a “paucity of evidence,” not social or 
economic disadvantage). 
172 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1376 (3d ed. 1940). Roger Park has 
described ways in which cross-examination may expose perjurers, but has 
also noted that “adversarial cross-examination may often be simply 
‘dramatized argument,’” and that “the adversarial context of cross-
examination undoubtedly inhibits the asking of clarifying questions, 
because fear of backfire prevents advocates from delving in the unknown.”  
Roger C. Park, Adversarial Influences on the Interrogation of Trial Witnesses, in 
ADVERSARIAL V. INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 131, 145-63, 166 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. 
Penrod eds., 2004).  Thus, he suggests that jurors be allowed to ask 
clarifying questions and that, “in high-stakes criminal cases,” a lawyer assist 
them in this enterprise, a procedure which is, at the least, quasi-inquisitorial.  
Id. at 166.
173 Cf. State v. Van Sickle, 411 N.W.2d 665, 666-667 (S.D. 1987) 
(stating that courts should warn defendants who wish to proceed pro se that 
“presenting a defense is not a simple matter of telling one's story,” but 
requires adherence to various “technical rules” governing the conduct of a 
trial.  ). 
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the system’s ability to promote substantive policy objectives, such as 
rehabilitation, crime prevention, deterrence, restitution, and 
retribution.  As Mathews itself suggested,174 inquisitorial methods 
might be perceived as fairer and more accurate when the inquiry is  
“scientific,” and thus might be preferable when the decision is a 
clinical judgment about whether a juvenile needs treatment to 
prevent recidivism rather than a moral judgment about 
blameworthiness and punishment.175  Even if, however, the juvenile 
justice system continues its trend toward a punitive regime, the 
choice between the traditional adversarial model and a more 
investigative approach is not a foregone conclusion, as the European 
example illustrates.  The procedural choice should not be based, as it 
has largely been up to now, on whether the juvenile justice system is 
genuinely therapeutic (and therefore does not require more 
“protective” adversarial procedures), but rather should be driven 
primarily by an empirical assessment of which procedural mix best 
achieves the goals of the system, whatever they are. 
The choice of procedures will also be affected by other 
empirical considerations.  It may be, for example, that certain 
approaches directly contribute to a substantive policy objective, rather 
than merely facilitate its implementation. For instance, some research 
suggests that “relational”procedures focused on promoting dignity 
are better at reducing recidivism independent of whether they 
produce outcomes the juvenile prefers.176 Along the same lines, 
research suggests that the right to silence inhibits prospects for 
rehabilitation.177  Another consideration might be whether the chosen 
174 424 U.S. at 322 (“The decision whether to discontinue disability 
benefits will normally turn upon “routine, standard, and unbiased medical
reports by physician specialists.”).
175 However, we would be the first to concede that the latter 
judgments are far from infallible. See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence 
of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L.REV. 1, 6-11 (2003).
176 William R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation 
and the Prevalence and Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-
Analysis, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 137, 160-62, 164 (analysis of fifteen studies that 
found that juvenile offenders who take part in mediation are up to 26% less 
likely to recidivate than those who go to court and commit less severe 
offenses); Shelly Jackson & Mark R. Fondacaro, Procedural Justice in Resolving 
Family Conflict: Implications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 L. & POL’Y 101, 
116 (1999) (finding that adolescents who reported their parents did not treat 
them with dignity were more likely to engage in deviant behavior).
177 Self-Incrimination Rights Conflicts with Treatment, Home Release 
Programs, 4 CORRECTIONAL L. REP. 1 (1992). See also, Stephanos Bibas & 
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procedure would permit synergies with other child-based legal 
agendas.  For example, a modern trend in family law is toward the 
unification of legal systems dealing with cases involving children 
(e.g., dependency, divorce, custody, delinquency).178  The purpose of 
this unified court is to have all legal matters involving children and 
families addressed by a single decisionmaker rather than subject the 
same family to multiple jurisdictions and judges, an arrangement 
that might provide significant benefits to juvenile offenders.179
Insistence on strict adversarial safeguards for delinquency cases 
could make this integration unfeasible, however, given the less 
formal procedures relied on by other family law courts. The 
important point is that data should be collected in an ongoing 
manner to assess the extent to which specified and adopted policy 
objectives are being met at the individual-child level and with respect 
to the system as a whole.  
VI.  Conclusion
Justice Fortas was correct when he proclaimed that juvenile 
offenders prior to the Kent decision experienced the worst of both 
worlds, neither adequate due process protection nor effective 
rehabilitation.  For several decades juvenile justice reforms, 
instigated by lawyers and assisted by advocacy-oriented social 
scientists, sought to fix the juvenile justice system by focusing on 
providing children with adult procedural “safeguards.”  The 
reformers’ hope was that children would at least get the best of one 
world: adult criminal due process protections.  As a result, children 
now have adult-like procedural safeguards.  
We have seen, however, that these modern procedural 
reforms rest on the misguided assumption that adult criminal 
procedures necessarily provide the ultimate in due process 
Richard A. Bierschback, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal 
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 148 (2004) (asserting that “[i]f encouraged in the 
right way, remorse and apology can help offenders cleanse their consciences 
and return to the moral fold,” and arguing that “procedure can and should 
make more room for the substantive values that these expressions serve.”).
178 Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court:  
Balancing Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L.Q. 381, 397 
(2003).
179 Id. at 396 (arguing that the unified court’s ability “to integrate a 
juvenile's behavior, environment, history--and family--into a service-
oriented, therapeutic remedy” is its “greatest strength in addressing 
delinquency matters.”).
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protections.  When procedural due process is conceptualized in 
terms of fundamental fairness based on maximizing accuracy, 
fairness, and efficiency in decision making, its implementation 
becomes an empirical question open to feedback and based on 
particular contextual demands.  Procedural justice research to date 
casts serious doubt on the reformers’ premise.
Another premise of the reformers is that the backward-
looking, culpability-based system of justice is both morally superior 
and less subject to abuse than the preventive model.180  Thus, along 
with adult procedures have come adult liability principles.  Calls for 
more retribution and punishment have hardened, while support for 
rehabilitation—Justice Fortas’ other bad “world”--has diminished.  
While a performance-based management system focused on 
fundamental fairness does not require the adoption of any particular 
policy objective, we have argued elsewhere that a rehabilitation-
oriented regime focused on risk management and crime prevention 
is preferable to a punishment-based model.181  We believe that if the 
juvenile justice system develops a focus on both fundamental 
fairness and maintains its rehabilitative and preventive goals, 
children will truly receive the best of both worlds: procedural 
safeguards that have a demonstrated impact on the fairness and 
accuracy of decision making and intervention programs focused on 
principles of least restrictive intervention and crime prevention.     
180 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: 
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 34-35 (1982) (recommending “just deserts” 
determinate sentencing in the juvenile delinquency context); Feld, supra note 
13, at 131-32 (arguing for a culpability-based system because the 
rehabilitative approach relies on  “rudimentary and unproven treatment 
techniques,” and because the juvenile court cannot “combine successfully 
criminal social control and social welfare in one system.”).
181   Christopher Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: 
The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 185 (1999).
